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ABSTRACT
Arguments about the safety, security, and correctness of a
complex system are often made in the form of an assurance
case. An assurance case is a structured argument, often rep-
resented with a graphical interface, that presents and sup-
ports claims about a system’s behavior. The argument may
combine different kinds of evidence to justify its top level
claim. While assurance cases deliver some level of guarantee
of a system’s correctness, they lack the rigor that proofs from
formal methods typically provide. Furthermore, changes in
the structure of a model during development may result in
inconsistencies between a design and its assurance case. Our
solution is a framework for automatically generating assur-
ance cases based on 1) a system model specified in an archi-
tectural design language, 2) a set of logical rules expressed
in a domain specific language that we have developed, and
3) the results of other formal analyses that have been run
on the model. We argue that the rigor of these automati-
cally generated assurance cases exceeds those of traditional
assurance case arguments because of their more formal log-
ical foundation and direct connection to the architectural
model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software/Program Verification]: Reliability;
D.2.11 [Software Architectures]: Languages
General Terms
Reliability; Security; Languages; Verification
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1. INTRODUCTION
The design of complex systems such as Unmanned Air Ve-
hicles (UAVs) can be greatly improved through the use of
advanced system and software architecting tools. In previ-
ous work, we have successfully used model checking to verify
software components that have been created using model-
based development (MBD) tools such as Simulink [27]. An
objective of our current research is to build on this success
and extend the reach of model checking and other formal
methods to system design models.
The Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL)
[12] is targeted for capturing the important design concepts
in real-time distributed embedded systems. The AADL lan-
guage can capture both the hardware and software architec-
ture in a hierarchical format. It provides hardware compo-
nent models including processors, buses, memories, and I/O
devices, and software component models including threads,
processes, and subprograms. Interfaces for these compo-
nents and data flows between components can also be de-
fined. The language offers a high degree of flexibility in
terms of architecture and component detail. This supports
incremental development where the architecture is refined
to increasing levels of detail and where components can be
refined with additional details over time.
One of our core innovations is to structure the formal-
izations and proofs by following the AADL descriptions of
the system. In other work, we did this through the use of
formal assume-guarantee contracts that correspond to the
component requirements for each component [5]. Our cur-
rent work on DARPA’s High Assurance Cyber Military Sys-
tems (HACMS) program is focused on security properties of
UAVs [8]. We have found that in assuring the cyber-security
properties of aircraft designs we need to integrate a variety
of evidence with varying levels of formality. This has been
our motivation to explore assurance case approaches.
In this paper we report on Resolute, a new assurance case
language and tool which is based on architectural models.
In developing Resolute, we have followed the same approach
of embedding the proof in the architectural model for the ve-
hicle, tightly coupling terms in the assurance case with evi-
dence derived directly from the system design artifacts. This
ensures that we maintain consistency between the system
design and its associated assurance case(s). Design changes
that might invalidate some aspect of an assurance case can
be immediately flagged by our tool for correction.
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G1
System is acceptably 
secure
S1
Argument over all 
hazards
A
A1
All credible hazards 
have been identified
C1
List of hazards
G2
Hazard1 mitigated
G3
Hazard2 mitigated
G4
Hazard2 mitigated
Sln1
Evidence 
from formal 
verification
S2
Argument over 
diverse evidence
G5
Evidence claim 1
Sln2
Testing 
evidence
G6
Evidence claim 1
Figure 1: Example of GSN notation
2. ASSURANCE CASES
Using Resolute, the goal is to construct an assurance case
[20, 21, 22] about a system specified in AADL. From [17],
an assurance case is defined as:
A reasoned and compelling argument, supported
by a body of evidence, that a system, service or
organization will operate as intended for a de-
fined application in a defined environment.
Assurances cases are constructed to show that one or more
claims about the system are acceptable; usually the claims
are defined for an aspect of the system such as safety (safety
cases) or security (security cases). For complex systems,
these structured arguments are often large and complicated.
In order to construct, present, discuss, and review these ar-
guments, it is necessary that they are clearly documented.
Several notations have been proposed to properly document
assurance cases. The most popular notation is currently the
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [17, 24], which is used in
several assurance-case tool suites.
An example of the GSN notation is shown in Figure 1.
In GSN, we have goals (G1..G6 in Figure 1) that repre-
sent claims about the system. When a claim is established
through reasoning about subclaims, a strategy (S1, S2 in Fig-
ure 1) is used to describe the nature of how the subclaims
establish the claim. Furthermore, strategies often rely on as-
sumptions in order for the strategy to be reasonably applied.
In the figure, we make an argument that the system is ac-
ceptably secure by enumerating the hazards that prevent it
from being secure and demonstrating that these hazards are
mitigated. An assumption of this strategy (A1 in Figure 1)
is that we have enumerated all reasonable security hazards.
Also, it is often necessary to provide the context in which
a strategy or goal occurs: in the case of the enumeration
strategy, the context is the list of identified hazards. We
terminate the argument either in goals that have no further
decomposition, graphically notated by a diamond (shown in
the figure by goals G4 and G6), or in solutions (Sln1, Sln2
in Figure 1) that describe evidence for the goal. GSN argu-
ments form directed acyclic graphs; it is possible to use the
same subclaim or evidence as part of the justification of a
larger claim, but it is not well-formed to have a cyclic chain
of reasoning within a GSN graph.
To be compelling, the argument must provide sufficient
assurance in the claims made about the system. Construct-
ing such arguments is quite difficult, even given appropriate
notations. First, proper claims must be identified to define
the objectives of the assurance case. Then appropriate argu-
mentation must be constructed: such argumentation must
often take into account the environment in which the system
is used, the artifacts that are constructed during system de-
sign, implementation, and test, and the processes followed
during the development and implementation cycle. There
is a rich body of literature that describes proper processes
and patterns for constructing assurance cases, e.g. [20, 21,
22, 23, 31, 10, 18, 16, 15].
3. AADL
Our domain of interest is distributed real-time embedded
systems (including both hardware and software), such as
comprise the critical functionality in commercial and mil-
itary aircraft. Many aerospace companies have adopted
MBD processes for production of software components, and
we have successfully applied formal analysis at this level to
verify component requirements. However, the system design
process is often less rigorous: system-level descriptions of the
interactions of distributed components, resource allocation
decisions, and communication mechanisms between compo-
nents are typically ad hoc and not based on analyzable mod-
els. Application of formal analysis methods at the system
level requires 1) an abstraction that defines how components
will be represented in the system model, and 2) selection of
an appropriate formal modeling language.
In this approach, the architectural model includes inter-
face, interconnections, and specifications for components but
not their implementations. It describes the interactions be-
tween components and their arrangement in the system, but
the components themselves are black boxes. The component
implementations are described separately by the existing
MBD environment and artifacts (or by traditional program-
ming languages, where applicable). They are represented in
the system model by the subset of their specifications that
is necessary to describe their system-level interactions. This
distinction between system architecture and component im-
plementation is important to ensure the scalability of the
analyses that we wish to perform.
We have selected AADL as a system modeling language
for our work. AADL is described in SAE standard AS5506B
and has a sufficiently precise definition to support formal-
ization of its semantics [12]. It provides syntax for describ-
ing both hardware and software aspects of the system so
that requirements related to resource allocation, scheduling,
and communication between distributed elements can be ad-
dressed. Textual and graphical versions of the language are
Figure 2: Simplified AADL model of HACMS quadcopter
available with tool support for each [30]. An important fea-
ture of the language is its extensibility via the annex mech-
anism. Language developers can embed new syntax into an
AADL model to provide new features or to support addi-
tional analyses. Annex expressions have full access to the
rest of the model providing the ability to refer to compo-
nents and properties described in the base AADL language.
We have used this annex mechanism to add behavioral con-
tracts and assurance case rules to our system architecture
models.
Figure 2 shows an example AADL system model (us-
ing the graphical syntax) that we have developed for the
HACMS program. The model describes a UAV that in-
cludes a simplified version of the system software along with
the processing hardware (PX4FMU) and an I/O board for
motors and radios (PX4IOAR). The actual flight software
model is over 7,000 lines of AADL and includes 35 comput-
ing threads, with a C implementation of over 50K lines of
code.
In the HACMS project we are concerned primarily with
cyber-security of UAVs. We are developing analysis tools
based on the AADL language that allow us to verify impor-
tant security and information flow properties for this kind
of system. We are also developing synthesis tools that al-
low us to generate glue code and system configuration data
for the system. This data, along with the component im-
plementations, provide everything needed to build the final
flight binaries from the AADL model. To show that our re-
sults scale to real military systems, we are also transitioning
these technologies for demonstration on Boeing’s Unmanned
Little Bird helicopter [4].
4. RESOLUTE
Resolute is a language and tool for constructing assur-
ance cases based on AADL models. Users formulate claims
and rules for justifying those claims, which Resolute uses to
construct assurance cases. Both the claims and rules are pa-
rameterized by variable inputs which are instantiated using
elements from the models. This creates a dependence of the
assurance case on the AADL model and means that changes
to the AADL model can result in changes to the assurance
case. This also means that a small set of rules can result in a
large assurance case since each rule may be applied multiple
times to different parts of the architecture model.
Resolute is designed primarily to show the structure of an
argument; in the GSN notation, it would define how a claim
is provable from subclaims. In some ways, Resolute is richer
than GSN; as shown below, it supports parametric goals and
arbitrary Boolean relations between claims and subclaims
rather than simple conjunctions or m-of-n relations. On the
other hand, it does not currently provide specific placehold-
ers for context and assumption information. In GSN, this
information is explicit, but informal: it is documented to
aid the readers and writers of the assurance case. Resolute
currently does not have a placeholder for this information,
but this could easily be remedied by adding string properties
to document contextual aspects of claim/subclaim relation-
ships. To define context and assumption ideas more formally
is more challenging and something that we are considering
for future work.
4.1 Claims and Rules
In Resolute, each claim corresponds to a first-order pred-
icate. For example, a user might represent a claim such as
“The memory of process p is protected from alteration by
other processes” using the predicate memory_protected(p :
process). The user specifies rules for memory_protected
which provide possible ways to justify the underlying claim.
Logically, these rules correspond to global assumptions which
have the form of an implication with the predicate of interest
as the conclusion. For example, an operating system such
as NICTA’s secure microkernel seL4—which we are using in
HACMS—might enforce memory protection on its own [25]:
memory_protected(p : process) <=
(property_lookup(p, OS) = "seL4")
Here we query the architectural model to determine the op-
erating system for the given process. Another way to satisfy
memory protection may be to examine all the other pro-
cesses which share the same underlying memory component.
Note that in AADL a “process” represents a logical memory
space while a“memory”represents a physical memory space.
memory_protected(p : process) <=
forall (mem : memory). bound(p, mem) =>
forall (q : process). bound(q, mem) =>
memory_safe_process(q)
In the above rule, we are querying the architectural model
via the universal quantification over memory and process
components. Note that quantification is always finite since
we only quantify over architectural components and other
finite sets. The built-in bound predicate determines how
software maps to hardware. In addition, we call another
user defined predicate memory_safe_process to determine
if a process is memory safe. In the resulting assurance case,
the claim that a process p is memory protected will be sup-
ported by subclaims that all processes in its memory space
are memory safe. Thus there will be one supporting sub-
claim for each process in the memory space.
The above rules for memory protection illustrate a cou-
ple of ways to justify the desired claim, but they do not
constitute a complete description of memory protection nor
a complete listing of sufficient evidence. This is a critical
point in Resolute: rules are sufficient, but not complete.
The negation of a claim can never be used in an argument
(i.e., in logic programming parlance, we do not make a closed
world assumption). This is a manifestation of the traditional
phrase “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” In-
stead, if the user truly wants to use a claim in a negative con-
text, that notion must be formalized as a separate positive
claim with its own rules for what constitutes sufficient evi-
dence. For example, one may be interested in a claim such as
memory_violated which has rules which succeed only when
a concrete memory violation is detected.
4.2 Computations
Separate from claims, Resolute has a notion of compu-
tations which are complete and can thus be used in both
positive and negative contexts. Usually these computations
are based on querying the model. For example, the bound
predicate above is a built-in computation which returns a
Boolean value and is used in a negative context in the rule
for memory_protected. Users may also introduce their own
functions which are defined via a single equation such as
message_delay(p : process) =
sum({thread_message_delay(t)
for (t : thread) if bound(t, p)})
Here sum is a built-in function and thread_message_delay
is another user-defined function.
Computations may contribute to an assurance case, but
they do not appear in it independently since they do not
make any explicit claim. Instead, a user may wrap claims
around computations as needed, for instance a claim such
as “message delay time for p is within acceptable bounds”
using the message_delay function.
Since claims cannot be used negatively while computa-
tions can, claims may not appear within computations. This
creates two separate levels in Resolute: the logical level on
top and the computation level beneath it. The logical level
determines the claims, rules, and evidence used in the as-
surance case argument, while the computation level helps
determine which claims are relevant in a particular context
and may directly satisfy some claims by performing compu-
tations over the model.
External analyses are incorporated in Resolute as com-
putations. An external analysis is run each time the corre-
sponding computation is invoked. This is useful for deploy-
ing existing tools for analyzing properties such as schedula-
bility or resource allocation.
5. TOOL ENVIRONMENT
We have implemented Resolute as an AADL annex using
the Open Source AADL Tool Environment (OSATE) [30]
plug-in for the Eclipse IDE. Resolute itself is Open Source
under a BSD License and available online [29]. Using OS-
ATE, users are able to interact with Resolute in the same
environment in which they develop their AADL models. In
addition, the resulting framework provides on-the-fly syn-
tactic and semantic validation. For example, references to
AADL model elements in the Resolute annex are linked to
the actual AADL objects in the same project so that unde-
fined references and type errors are detected instantly.
The syntax of Resolute is inspired by logic programming.
Each rule defines the meaning and evidence for a claim. The
meaning of a claim is given by a text string in the rule which
is parameterized by the arguments of the claim. The body of
the rule consists of an expression which describes sufficient
evidence to satisfy that claim. Claims may be parameterized
by AADL types (e.g., threads, systems, memories, connec-
tions, etc.), integers, strings, Booleans, or sets.
Figure 3 shows an example of two Resolute rules. The
meaning of the claim is given by the associated text, for
only_receive_decrypt(x : component) <=
** "The component " x " only receives messages that pass Decrypt" **
forall (c : connection).
(parent(destination(c)) = x) =>
is_sensor_data(c) or only_receive_decrypt_connection(c)
only_receive_decrypt_connection(c : connection) <=
** "The connection " c " only carries messages that pass Decrypt" **
let src : component = parent(source(c));
unalterable_connection(c) and (is_decrypt(src) or only_receive_decrypt(src))
Figure 3: Example Resolute rules
bound(logical : component, physical : component) : bool =
memory_bound(logical, physical) or
connection_bound(logical, physical) or
processor_bound(logical, physical)
memory_bound(logical : component, physical : component) : bool =
has_property(logical, Deployment_Properties::Actual_Memory_Binding) and
member(physical, property(logical, Deployment_Properties::Actual_Memory_Binding))
connection_bound(logical : component, physical : component) : bool =
has_property(logical, Deployment_Properties::Actual_Connection_Binding) and
member(physical, property(logical, Deployment_Properties::Actual_Connection_Binding))
processor_bound(logical : component, physical : component) : bool =
has_property(logical, Deployment_Properties::Actual_Processor_Binding) and
member(physical, property(logical, Deployment_Properties::Actual_Processor_Binding))
Figure 4: Definition of bound in the Resolute standard library
example only_receive_decrypt(x) means: “The compo-
nent x only receives commands that pass Decrypt.” An in-
stantiated version of this string is what will appear in the
corresponding assurance case. The built-in functions like
destination and source return the feature to which a con-
nection is attached, and the built-in parent then gives the
component which holds that feature. These rules also make
use of other user-defined claims such as is_sensor_data and
unalterable_connection which talk about the content and
integrity of connections. Note that the two claims shown
in the figure are mutually recursive. Together, these claims
walk over a model cataloging the data-flow and constructing
a corresponding assurance case.
Many claims, rules, and functions will appear within a
Resolute annex library which is typically a top-level file in
an AADL project. These libraries define the rules for all
claims in Resolute, but do not make any assertions about
what arguments the claims should hold on. In addition, Res-
olute comes with a standard library of predefined functions
for common operations. For instance, the bound predicate
for determining if a logical component is bound to a spe-
cific physical component is part of the standard library and
defined as in Figure 4.
An assurance case is initiated in Resolute by adding a
prove statement to the Resolute annex for an AADL compo-
nent. A prove statement consists of a claim applied to some
concrete arguments. An example prove statement is shown
in Figure 5 where the claim only_receive_ground_station
is associated with the motor controller thread. When a Res-
process implementation Main_Loop.Impl
subcomponents
MC: thread Motor_Control
...
annex resolute {**
prove only_receive_ground_station(MC)
**}
end Main_Loop.Impl;
Figure 5: Prove statements for Resolute claims
olute analysis is run on an AADL system instance, an as-
surance case is generated for every prove statement that
appears in any component within that instance.
Figure 6 shows a portion of a successful assurance case
generated by Resolute on our simplified UAV model. Each
claim is shown on a single line. Supporting claims are shown
indented one level beneath the claim they support. A check
next to a claim indicates that it is proven. Figure 7 shows
a portion of a failed assurance case. An exclamation point
indicates that a claim has failed. In this case, the AADL
model includes a safety controller which is allowed to bypass
the Decrypt component and directly send messages to the
UAV. This bypass is detected Resolute. In fact, the only
difference between Figures 6 and 7 is the AADL model. The
claims and rules are identical in both.
Figure 6: Example of a successful assurance case from Resolute
Figure 7: Example of a failed assurance cases from Resolute
The assurance case shown in Figure 6 is constructed over
our simplified UAV model. We ported this assurance case
to the true UAV model once the latter was available. Al-
though the true UAV model contained seven times as many
software components as the simplified model, very few of the
Resolute rules needed to be changed. The most significant
change was that the true UAV model has data-flow cycles,
and therefore the simple recursive rules used in Figure 3 are
insufficient. Instead, we created more sophisticated rules
which recursively computed the set of components which
were reachable prior to passing through the Decrypt com-
ponent, and then we justified the claim that the given set
was complete and did not have access to the motor control
component.
Assurance cases as shown in Figures 6 and 7 are interac-
tive in the Resolute user interface. The user can navigate
through the assurance case and select a claim to navigate
to locations in the model relevant to the claim. For exam-
ple, the user can navigate to any of the AADL components
referenced as input parameters to the claim or can navigate
to the rule that defines the claim. This makes it much eas-
ier to figure out why an assurance case is failing or why a
particular part of the assurance case has a given structure.
An assurance case generated by Resolute is also a stand-
alone object. After construction, it no longer depends on
Resolute or even the AADL model, though it of course still
refers to elements of the model. This means the assurance
case can be used as an independent certification artifact. In
addition, Resolute allows assurance cases to be exported to
other formats and assurance case tools such as CertWare
[28].
6. FORMAL LOGIC
The Resolute language consists of both a logic and a com-
putational sublanguage. The logic of Resolute is an intu-
itionistic logic similar to pure Prolog, but augmented with
explicit quantification. The logic is parameterized by the
computational sublanguage, and requires only that the sub-
language is deterministic. This allows the computational
sublanguage to be customized to any domain (e.g. AADL
in our context) and to be expanded and refined, without
worrying about the logical consequences. In fact, we do not
even require termination for the computational sublanguage,
though in practice a non-terminating computation will lead
to non-terminating proof search.
6.1 Syntax
Let the type of formulas be o. We assume the usual logical
constants of ∧,∨,⇒: o → o → o and ∀,∃ : (α → o) → o for
every type α not containing o. Let the type of Booleans be
bool with constants true and false. We use the constant
〈·〉 : bool → o to inject Booleans into formulas. We assume
a notion of evaluation e ⇓ v read “e evaluates to v”. We
assume evaluation is deterministic. The full set of types and
terms is left unspecified, but would typically be determined
by the computational sublanguage.
6.2 Sequent Rules
We define a judgment Γ ` G where Γ is a set of formulas
called assumptions and G is a formula called the goal. This
judgment holds when the goal G is a consequence of assump-
tions Γ in the Resolute logic. The rules for this judgment
are presented in Figure 8.
Γ ` G1 Γ ` G2
Γ ` G1 ∧G2 ∧R
Γ ` Gi
Γ ` G1 ∨G2 ∨Ri=1,2
Γ, G1 ` G2
Γ ` G1 ⇒ G2 ⇒R
Γ ` G(t1) · · · Γ ` G(tn)
Γ ` ∀x :α. G(x) ∀R
Γ ` G(ti)
Γ ` ∃x :α. G(x) ∃Ri=1...n
where α = {t1, . . . , tn}
Γ ` G(t¯)
Γ ` A(t¯) backchain
where ∀x¯.A(x¯)⇐ G(x¯) ∈ Γ.
e ⇓ false
Γ, 〈e〉 ` G eval-L
e ⇓ true
Γ ` 〈e〉 eval-R
Figure 8: Resolute logic rules
The rules for ∧, ∨, and ⇒ are standard. The quantifica-
tion rules apply only to types with finitely many inhabitants
since the rules work via explicit enumeration. This simplis-
tic treatment of quantification means that proof search only
needs to consider ground terms. Moreover, finiteness is ap-
propriate for our domain where we want to quantify over
types such as all threads in a model or all processes within
a particular system. The rule for backchain allows the as-
sumptions in Γ to be used in constructing a proof of an
atomic goal. Note that in the backchain rule, A stands for
an atomic formula, i.e., a predicate applied to arguments.
Finally, the rules for evaluation allow a proof to be finished
by finding an assumption which evaluates to false or a con-
clusion that evaluates to true.
User specified claims in Resolute are treated as predicates
in the logic, and the rules for claims are treated as initial
assumptions. Each prove statement in the AADL model
is translated to a goal G while all the Resolute rules are
translated into the initial context Γ. Then proof search is
performed on Γ ` G. If a proof is found, that proof is trans-
formed into an assurance case by replacing each intermediate
sequent of the form Γ ` A(t¯) by the instantiated version of
the claim text for the claim A(x¯). Thus, for us, an assur-
ance case is a proof in the Resolute logic, and browsing the
assurance case means traversing the proof tree.
6.3 Customizing the Resolute Logic for AADL
The Resolute logic we use in our implementation is a cus-
tomization of the general Resolute logic. In particular, we
allow quantification over all AADL model types (threads,
process, etc) and over all user computed sets. Our compu-
tational sublanguage is based on the Requirements Enforce-
ment Analysis Language [13]. Our sublanguage includes all
the AADL model types and more traditional types of inte-
gers, reals, strings, ranges, and sets. There are pre-defined
functions for common operations (e.g. sum, union, member)
or queries against the AADL model properties and compo-
nents. Users may also define their own functions even using
recursion, and thus our computational sublanguage is Tur-
ing complete. Moreover, our sublanguage allows calls out
to external tools for richer analyses such as scheduling or
model checking.
Users may specify any rules or meanings for claims, and
thus Resolute can make no judgment about how valid the
resulting argument is. Resolute only ensures that the con-
structed assurance cases are valid with respect to the user
specified claims and rules. Ultimately, the acceptability of
an assurance case generated by Resolute must depend on
traditional assurance case techniques such as expert review.
Resolute provides a way of keeping an assurance case syn-
chronized with an architecture model, but the quality of that
assurance case is still dependent on the user.
7. RELATEDWORK
As discussed in Section 2, assurance cases have a large
and well-developed literature. Patterns for assurance case
argumentation have been considered in [23, 31, 10, 18], and
common fallacies in assurance cases are considered in [16].
An approach to apply and evolve assurance cases as part of
system design is found in [15], which is similar to the pro-
cess we have used in applying the Resolute tools. A com-
parison of assurance cases to prescriptive standards such as
DO178B/C is provided by [19]. Recent work on confidence
cases as a means of assessing assurance case arguments is
found in [14].
Several commercial and research tools support the devel-
opment of assurance cases. ASCE [1] from Adelard is cur-
rently the most widely used commercial tool for construct-
ing assurance cases. ASCE supports integration with com-
mercial requirements management tools such as DOORS,
constructing confidence cases with assurance cases, and in-
tegration with a variety of tools through its plug-in archi-
tecture. Other assurance case tools include AdvoCATE [11]
from NASA Ames, CertWare [28] from NASA Langley, D-
Case [26], and NOR-STA [7]. These tools provide struc-
tured editing, visualization, metrics, and reasoning tools for
safety arguments but are not tied into a system architectural
model.
In [3], a safety case in ASCE involving a combination of
mechanized proof, testing, and hand-proofs is used to argue
that the maximum error introduced in the computation of
a monotonic function is within some tolerance of the actual
value of the function. This is similar to how we use Resolute
in the example in Section 5; we assemble disparate evidence
from different verification techniques towards an argument.
Unlike our work, the ASCE safety case is not directly inte-
grated into the software/system architecture. Similar work
in [9] describes patterns for using proofs within a safety case
and automation for generating portions of the proof as a
part of the safety case.
The Evidential Tool Bus (ETB) [6] is very similar in syn-
tax and semantics to Resolute. It is supported by a Datalog-
style logic and is designed to combine evidence from a va-
riety of sources. However, the focus of the ETB is on dis-
tribution and on provenance—that is, to log the sequence
of tool invocations that were performed to solve the query.
It uses timestamps to determine which analyses are out of
date with respect to the current development artifacts and
to only re-run those analyses that are not synchronized with
the current development artifacts. In addition, it is designed
to perform distributed execution of analyses. Analysis tool
plug-ins are used to execute the analysis tools within ETB.
ETB is designed to be tool and model agnostic, and is there-
fore not integrated with a model of the system architecture.
The work in [2] ties together an assurance case with a
model-based notation (Simulink) for the purpose of demon-
strating that the Simulink-generated code meets its require-
ments. This work has many similarities to ours, in that the
assurance case is closely tied to the hierarchical structure of
the model. It is more rigorous (in that the assurance case
is derived from a formal proof) but also much more narrow,
corresponding to a component in the system assurance cases
that we create. The two approaches could perhaps be inte-
grated to provide more rigorous safety cases for a wider class
of software developed in a model-based environment.
8. FUTUREWORK
We have generated a number of assurance cases with Res-
olute for the design of a UAV in the HACMS project. Specif-
ically, we have generated assurance cases that reason about
the flow of information through the vehicle and the avail-
ability of resources under different operating modes. The
tool has been useful for modeling requirements of the ar-
chitecture at early phases of the design, and verifying that
they still hold in later phases. In future work we plan to
make the assurance cases generated by Resolute exportable
to more assurance case tools. In order to support this, we
may extend Resolute with a more complete set of standard
assurance case constructs. For example, we may introduce
strategies as first-class constructs by augmenting Resolute
rules with explicit textual descriptions that would then ap-
pear in the assurance case. We also plan to improve the
grammar to support more features of AADL.
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